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Drugs and Alcohol in the Workplace1
Prepared by the attorneys of the Labor and Employment
Law Department Venable, Baetjer and Howard, Esqs.
Baltimore, Maryland
I. Introduction
During the last two years, there have been a number of significant
developments regarding drug and alcohol testing (hereinafter "drug test-
ing"). The Supreme Court has led the way by issuing two opinions
upholding the suspicionless testing of railway workers and some Customs
Service employees. Although neither of these opinions addresses the issue
of random testing, they are the Court's first statements on the con-
stitutionality of employee drug testing generally. The Court also recently
held that the unilateral implementation of drug-testing programs by
railroad employers does not constitute a "major dispute" under the Rail-
way Labor Act, so that railroad employers are not required to bargain with
unions representing affected employees before instituting such programs.
Since these Supreme Court decisions, the NLRB and several U.S.
Courts of Appeals and District Courts have followed up with further
explication of the extent to which employers may legally test their
employees for drug use. Moreover, both Congress, the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) have taken
important action related to drug testing. On October 21, 1988, Congress
passed the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988. Effective March 18, 1989,
the Act requires federal grantees and most federal contractors to imple-
ment drug-free workplace policies. It does not require testing of
employees, however. Interim Department of Defense Regulations, on the
other hand, effective October 31, 1988, require that government defense
contractors test employees holding "sensitive positions." Also, DOT has
issued various drug-free regulations that require covered employers to put
in place certain aspects of a drug-testing program in place by Decem-2
ber 21, 1989. Finally, state courts (and legislatures) are beginning to
1 Copyright 1990 by The American Law Institute. Reprinted with the permission of
the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing
Professional Education.
2 For example, Maryland has amended its drug-testing law, effective July 1, 1990, to
require employers to satisfy certain standards and procedures for drug and alcohol testing
of employees and applicants for employment (eg., requiring that specimens be tested at state
certified laboratories). Also effective January 1, 1991, Maryland licensing authorities will
be permitted to sanction state-licensed professionals convicted of controlled dangerous
substance violations. In the District of Columbia, a drug-testing bill entitled the "Employee
Substance Testing Act of 1989 is under consideration in the Committee on Housing and
Economic Development.
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address the issues raised by drug testing under both state constitutional
and common law tort theories.
All of these various developments, Supreme Court, federal and
state, are summarized below.
II. Supreme Court Decides Major Drug-testing
Issues
A. Skinner Case
In Skinner v. RailwayLabor ExectttivesAssociation, 109 S.Ct.
1402 (1989) (decided March 21, 1989), the Supreme Court upheld against
a Fourth Amendment challenge Federal Railway Administration regula-
tions that mandate the testing of railroad employees involved in major
train accidents, even where there is no individualized suspicion of drug
or alcohol use, and permit testing of railroad employees for other incidents
or rule violations in the absence of suspicion of on-duty impairment.
In so holding, the Court made several significant preliminary
determinations. First, the Court concluded that because the testing was
mandated or permitted by the government, which took more than a
"passive" approach to and sought to share the fruits of the testing, Fourth
Amendment standards were applicable to the testing procedures even
though the regulations were implemented by private sector employers.
Second, the Court found that collecting of blood and urine for testing, as
well as administering breath tests to detect the presence of alcohol, are
searches under the Fourth Amendment. Third, the Court held that neither
a warrant nor probable cause was required to permit testing of the
employees in question. Instead, said the Court, the testing requirements
of the regulations would pass constitutional muster if they met the less
restrictive Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances, which requires a balancing of the employee's privacy inter-
ests against promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
In concluding that the testing procedures met this test, the
Court held that the government had a compelling interest in regulating the
conduct of railway employees engaged in safety sensitive tasks to ensure
the safety of both the employees and the traveling public. Thus, while drug
testing in some contexts could result in serious intrusions into the privacy
expectations of employees, the governmental interests outweighed
employee privacy interests in this case.
Although the plaintiffs had argued that individualized
suspicion of drug or alcohol abuse prior to testing is essential to its
constitutional validity, the Court rejected this argument, citing several
reasons. First, the intrusions permitted by the regulations were "minimal"
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because the testing procedures used are recognized by society as not
unduly intrusive and the regulations contain safeguards to protect against
unnecessary intrusions, including establishment of collection procedures
similar to those encountered during regular physical examinations.
Second, and more importantly, railroad employees have a diminished
expectation of privacy because they work in an industry pervasively
regulated to ensure safety, a goal dependent on the health and the fitness
of the employee. Third, the governmental interest in testing without a
showing of individualized suspicion was compelling because an
employee will seldom display any outward signs of impairment prior to
an accident and evidence of individualized suspicion would be extremely
difficult to obtain at the chaotic scene of a major accident after it occurred.
Fourth, testing without individualized suspicion will serve to act as a
deterrent against illegal substance abuse because an employee cannot
predict when he or she will be involved in an accident or incident which
would subject the employee to testing.
Finally, the Court rejected the notion that because the test
could not determine whether an individual was intoxicated by drugs at the
time of testing or the degree of impairment, it was unreasonable. The
Court found this argument "flawed" because, even if the test showed only
recent drug use, this information could form the basis for further inves-
tigation into whether the employee was using drugs at the relevant time.
Moreover, this contention did not consider the regulations' goal of deter-
ring as well as detecting drug use.
B. Von Raab Case
In National Treasury Employees Union, et al. v. Von Raab,
109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989) (decided March 21, 1989), a case decided the same
day as Skinner, the Court upheld a Custom Service plan requiring
suspicionless urine testing of individuals seeking transfers to or em ploy-
ment in positions directly involved with drug interdiction or enforcement
of related laws and positions where the employee would be required to
carry a firearm. It remanded for further consideration, however, a
provision requiring the testing of those who handled classified material.
As in Skinner, the Court found that collection of urine samples
for drug testing was a Fourth Amendment search. It also concluded that
neither a warrant nor probable cause was required to test employees. The
testing provisions were required to meet only the standard of reasonable-
ness under the circumstances.
The Court concluded that testing of individuals seeking posi-
tions directly involving drug interdiction or carrying firearms was
reasonable even in the absence of a suspicion that the individual was using
drugs. The government, said the Court, has a compelling interest in
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assuring that its front interdiction personnel are physically fit and maintain
unimpeachable integrity and judgment. It also has a compelling interest
in assuring that those capable of using deadly force do not suffer from
impaired perception and judgment which could be caused by illegal
substance abuse. These interests outweigh the privacy interests of affected
employees, which the Court found to be diminished by the fact that
affected employees should reasonably expect that the Service will make
effective inquiry into their "fitness and probity" because of the nature of
their work.
The Court rejected the contention that the plan was uncon-
stitutional because it was not premised on a belief that the testing would
reveal drug use by the affected employees. The Court found that while the
testing program was not motivated by a perceived drug problem among
employees to be tested, it was nevertheless justified by strong safety and
national security interests in ensuring that drug abusers are not promoted
to the covered positions. The Court also rejected the argument that the fact
that users can avoid detection by temporary abstinence or alteration of
samples, rendered the plan unconstitutional, concluding that attempts to
abstain to cleanse one's system are unpredictable at best and adequate
safeguards against sample tampering were included in the program.
Finally, the Court found that the record did not provide
enough information to determine whether the testing program was con-
stitutional as it related to testing of those applying for positions where they
would have access to classified information. This portion of the case was
remanded for further development of what materials are deemed to be
classified and what privacy expectations existed in those who would have
access to such material.
C. Conrail Case
In Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") v. Railway
LaborExecutives'Association, 109 S.Ct. 2477 (1989), the Supreme Court
issued its first drug-testing ruling concerning a private employer. The
Conrail case involved Conrail's unilateral decision to include drug testing
as part of all periodic and return-from-leave physical examinations. This
inclusion of drug testing, which broadened the scope of Conrail's prior
drug testing, resulted from a serious drug-related Conrail accident that
occurred in the Baltimore/Washington area in January, 1987. The Court
had to decide whether Conrail's unilateral implementation of the drug-
testing program was a "major" or "minor" dispute under the Railway
Labor Act ("Act"). If the dispute were classified as "major," Conrail
would be required to bargain to impasse with its employee unions before
implementing the testing program.
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The Supreme Court held that Conrail's implementation
decision created a "minor" dispute, which did not necessitate bargaining
prior to implementation. The Court also held the Union had to contest
Conrail's decision by submitting it to compulsory and binding arbitration
before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. In support of its decision,
the Court reasoned that Conrail's admitted implied contractual authority
to conduct physical exams and to determine fitness-for-duty standards
arguably provided it with the flexibility to add drug testing to all periodic
and return-from-leave physical examinations. Yet, the Court was careful
to state that it was not addressing the merits of Conrail's action or
minimizing the Union's arguments against the action.
D. Other Recent Developments
In other recent developments, the Court declined to consider,
and thus let stand, rulings in the following cases: Copeland v. Philadel-
phia Police Dept., 840 F.2d 1139, 2 BNA IER Cases 1825 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1636 (April 3, 1989) (reasonable suspicion existed
to test police officer for drugs where test was requested two months after
girlfriend informed the police department that the officer used drugs, even
though girlfriend recanted accusation prior to request to take test and
police investigation failed to corroborate claim of drug use); Policemen's
Benevolent Assoc. of New Jersey v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d
133, 3 BNA IER Cases 699 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1637
(April 3, 1989) (random testing and testing as part of physical examina-
tion of police officers falls within administrative search exception to
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
Additionally, in light of the Court's decision in Skinner v.
RLEA, the D.C. Court of Appeals replaced an earlier opinion vacated by
the Supreme Court. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 2 BNA IER Cases
1121 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom Jenkins v Jones, 109 S.Ct. 1633
(April 3, 1989, replaced Jones v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir.
June 27, 1989). The D.C. Circuit's original opinion held that drug screen-
ing as part of routine physical was permissible, but that use of the EMIT
test was inappropriate because it did not measure current impairment and
thus did not bear a nexus to the legitimate concern for on-duty impairment.
On remand, the court replaced its original opinion by substituting lan-
guage that stated the D.C. Public School System's drug-testing program
was supported by compelling interests that outweighed employee privacy
concerns. Id. at 1476-77.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans
recently upheld the constitutionality, at least on its face, of President
Reagan's 1986 Executive Order authorizing random testing of federal
employees in sensitive positions and reasonable suspicion (of drug use)
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testing of all federal employees. National Treasury Employees Union v.
Bush, 891 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1989). And, even more recently, a federal
court in San Francisco enjoined numerous aspects of the United States
Navy's civilian testing program due to the overbreadth of the testing
categories. American Federation of Government Employees v. Cheney,
C88-3823-DLJ (D.C. NCalif. March 15, 1990). The court enjoined post-
accident testing involving motor vehicles or equipment; testing of
employees in jobs involving the maintenance of transportation or
mechanical equipment; testing of many "national security" labeled
employees; testing of employees working in drug/alcohol rehabilitation
jobs; and testing of employees in nearly all jobs labeled "protection of life
and property jobs." The court found these categories to be overinclusive
to an excessive degree.
III. Random Testing of Federal Employees After
Skinner and Von Raab Decisions
Since the Skinner and Von Raab decisions, there has been a trend
among lower federal courts to permit limited random testing based on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Skinner and Von Raab. Rather than focus-
ing on the random nature of the testing, these courts have generally
focused on the type of employees to be tested and the strength of the
governmental interest supporting the testing. As a result, consistent with
Skinner and Von Raab, these courts have upheld random drug testing that
has involved important and immediate public safety and national security
interests.
In Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court
lifted an injunction on the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") random
drug-testing program as it applied to employees holding top secret
security clearances, but maintained the injunction as to federal
prosecutors and employees with access to grand jury proceedings.
DOJ's program subjected five categories of employees to random
testing. Three of these categories-those having access to top secret
classified information, those having access to grand jury proceedings and
those having to prosecute criminal cases-filed suit to enjoin the random
testing. The two other categories of employees, presidential appointees
and employees responsible for handling and safeguarding controlled
substances, did not file suit.
Stating that its decision was largely controlled by Skinner and
Von Raab, the court initially considered whether the random nature of the
DOJ testing required a fundamentally different analysis than that used by
the Supreme Court for non-random testing. While the court stated that the
random nature of the DOJ testing was a "relevant consideration" and
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possibly a determinative one in a close case, the court further stated: "We
do not believe, however, that this aspect of the program requires us to
undertake a fundamentally different analysis from that pursued by the
Supreme Court in Von Raab." Thus, the court proceeded to weigh in-
dividual privacy interests against the following governmental interests
advanced by DOJ: integrity of the workforce, public safety, and protection
of sensitive information.
As to the workforce integrity interest, the court found that this did
not support random testing of employees in the broadly defined categories
of employees who prosecute criminal cases, employees with access to
grand jury proceedings and employees with access to classified informa-
tion. The court noted, however, that the need for workforce integrity might
support the random testing of employees in these categories if there was
a direct nexus between the employees' job duties and drug enforcement.
Similarly, with regard to the public safety interest, the court found
that the employee categories were too broadly defined to justify random
testing on this basis. Because the categories did not specifically pinpoint
those employees who posed a direct or immediate threat to public safety,
the court held that random testing of employees in each of the categories
was not supported by a public safety rationale.
The court did find that the government's interest in protecting
confidential information supported the random testing of employees in all
three categories requiring top secret security clearances. The court defined
"truly sensitive" information as that which merits a "top secret" classifica-
tion. Because top secret information relates to national security interests,
the court held that the random testing of employees holding top secret
clearances was constitutional. However, the court noted that the mere
access by employees to confidential information in grand jury proceed-
ings or in the prosecution of criminal cases did not support random testing.
Again, the court noted that more precise definition was required to support
the random testing of employees who either had access to confidential
information in grand jury proceedings or in federal prosecutions.
In lifting the injunction as to employees with top secret security
clearances, but in maintaining it as to those with access to confidential
information and as to federal prosecutors, the court specifically refrained
from redefining the employee categories in DOJ's testing program.
Rather, the court concluded it was best to allow DOJ the opportunity to
redefine its program, if it chose to do so.
More recently, in American Federation of Government Employees
(AFGE) v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court upheld the
Department of Transportation's ("DOT") drug-testing program which
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included the random testing of air traffic controllers and certain other
safety and security-related employees.
DOT classified employees into two groups for purposes of drug
testing. Category I employees are those who bear "a direct and immediate
impact on public health and safety, the protection of life and property, law
enforcement, or national security." Employees in Category I include, inter
alia, air traffic controllers, aviation safety inspectors, motor vehicle
operators, hazardous material inspectors and aircraft mechanics.
Category I employees are made subject to pre-appointment testing as well
as to the following five types of additional testing: (1) random; (2) peri-
odic "if they are required to take periodic physical examinations,"
(3) reasonable suspicion; (4) accident or unsafe practice; and (5) follow-
up. Category II employees are made subject to reasonable suspicion,
accident or unsafe practice and follow-up. The AFGE and the Category I
employees, which make up nearly half of DOT's 62,000 employees, filed
suit to enjoin the random testing aspect of DOT's program. Specifically,
appellants challenged the random testing of motor vehicle operators,
hazardous material inspectors and aircraft mechanics.
In upholding the random testing, the court initially determined that
DOT's overall program met "needs other than law enforcement" and thus,
did not necessarily have to be "supported by any level of particularized
suspicion." The court then proceeded to balance the government's inter-
ests in transportation safety against the privacy interests of the Category I
employees. The court found that the "extraordinary safety sensitivity" of
the bulk of the Category I positions was compelling. Also persuasive to
the court was the fact that most of the Category I employees worked in
non-traditional settings, making the detection of drug use more difficult.
Thus, the court held that the random testing of Category I employees was
not an unreasonable means of ensuring transportation safety. Recently, the
Supreme Court declined to review the D.C. court's decision to uphold the
DOT policy. American Federation of Government Employees i Skinner,
No. 89-1272 (U.S. April 30, 1990).
A number of other federal courts have also recently upheld limited
random testing.3 Based on all of these decisions, there seems to be a
3 Government Employees v. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989) (court upheld
Department of Education's random testing program for motor vehicle drivers and employees
with top secret clearance, but struck down random testing as to certain data processors);
NFFE v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (court upheld portions of U.S. Army's
civilian employee drug-testing plan, some of which included random drug testing) cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 864 (1990); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (court upheld
random drug testing of U.S. Army civilian employees having access to dangerous chemicals
at chemical weapons plant); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989) (court upheld
random drug testing of sworn Boston police officers) cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 404 (1989);
Brown v. City of Detroit, 715 F.Supp.(E.D. Mich. 1989) (courts upheld random drug testing
of sworn Detroit police officers). But see Transportation Institute v. United States Coast
Guard, 727 F.Supp. 648 (D.D.C. Dec. 18,1989) (court struck down Coast Guard regulations
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clearly developing trend that random testing is permissible if consistent
with the Supreme Court's analysis in Skinner and Von Raab.
IV. NLRB Issues Decisions On Duty to Bargain
Over Drug Testing
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") recently issued two
decisions, which clarify the scope of a unionized employer's duty to
bargain over drug and alcohol testing programs. In Johnson-Batemnan
Co., 295 NLRB No. 26 (1989), the NLRB held that drug testing of current
employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining. In Minneapolis Star
Tribune, 295 NLRB No. 63 (1989), however, the NLRB held that drug
and alcohol testing of applicants for employment is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Thus, based on these two decisions, a private
employer in a union setting must bargain about drug and alcohol testing
of current employees, but does not have to bargain about such testing for
applicants.
V. Federal Drug-Free Regulations Requiring
Drug-Testing Programs
A. Drug-Free Workplace Act
The Drug-Free Workplace Act applies to government con-
tracts valued at more than $25,000 and to government grants of any value.
HR 5210, §§ 5151-5160. The Act requires that employers do the follow-
ing:
(1) Publish a statement notifying employees that the un-
lawful manufacture, distribution, dispensation, posses-
sion or use of controlled substances is prohibited at the
workplace. The statement must specify the range of
disciplinary actions that may be taken against an
employee for violation of this policy.
(2) Establish a drug-free awareness program to inform
employees about:
(a) The dangers of drug abuse in the workplace;
(b) The employer's policy of maintaining a drug-free
workplace;
(c) Any available drug counseling, rehabilitation
and employee assistance program; and
requiring random testing of nearly all employees aboard commercial vessels).
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(d) The penalties that may be imposed upon
employees for drug abuse violations.
(3) Provide employees with a copy of the drug policy,
which requires them to agree to abide by the policy and
to notify the employer within five days of any criminal
drug statute conviction occurring in the workplace.
(4) Notify the contracting government office of any
employee drug conviction within ten days of being
notified thereof.
(5) Require the convicted employee to undergo drug
rehabilitation or discipline, which may include ter-
mination.
(6) Make a good-faith effort to maintain a drug-free
workplace.
The Act does not address the issue of drug-testing programs,
nor does it specify the type of discipline or sanction to be imposed on
offending employees, leaving these matters to the discretion of the
employer.
The penalty for noncompliance is the possible loss of govern-
ment contracts/grants for up to five years. Noncompliance occurs if there
is:
(1) False certification that a drug-free workplace program
is in effect;
(2) Failure to comply with the drug-free workplace cer-
tification; or
(3) The occurrence of a number of employee drug convic-
tions in the workplace sufficient to indicate noncom-
pliance with the certification.
The government recently issued final rules to implement the
Drug-Free Workplace Act. The rules, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,706 (to be codified
at 48 C.F.R. §§ 1, 9, 23, 42 and 52), apply to all federal agencies and go
into effect July 24, 1990. In order to abide by the Act, contractors working
on contracts over $25,000 are required to publish a statement notifying
employees that drug abuse in the workplace is prohibited, create an
ongoing drug program, require employees to report drug violations,
impose sanctions for drug abuse, and comply in good faith with all of the
requirements. The regulations do not apply to subcontractors. 102 DLR
A-15-17, May 25, 1990.
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B. Department of Defense Regulations
The Department of Defense's interim regulations, 53 FR
37763, contain both mandatory and iscretionary requirements. With
regard to the mandatory requirements, the regulations require a Depart-
ment of Defense contractor to institute and maintain a program designed
to achieve a drug-free workforce. The contractor is free to design its own
program, but the regulations suggest the following elements:
(1) Employee assistance programs emphasizing education,
counseling, rehabilitation and coordination with avail-
able community resources;
(2) Supervisory training to identify and address employee
drug abuse;
(3) Provision for self and supervisory referrals for drug
abuse problems;
(4) Testing for employees in "sensitive" positions, which
are defined as those employees:
(a) In positions having access to classified informa-
tion;
(b) In positions involving national security, health or
safety;
(c) In positions requiring a high degree of trust or
confidence.
Although the Department of Defense regulations do not ex-
plicitly require random drug testing, DOD has stated that random testing
is required to implement its regulations. 67 DLR A-9-11, April 10, 1989.
Because neither the Skinner nor the Von Raab cases address the issue of
random testing, it is unclear whether it is constitutional.
The DOD regulations suggest that an employer decide who
to test by considering the following:
(1) The nature of the work being performed under the
contract;
(2) The employee's duties;
(3) The efficient use of contractor resources; and
(4) The risk to public safety and security if the employee
fails to perform his or her position because of drug use.
The regulations also suggest discretionary drug testing in the
dfollowing circumstances:
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(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion that an employee
uses illegal drugs;
(2) When an employee has been involved in an accident or
unsafe practice;
(3) When it is part of or is a follow-up to counseling or
rehabilitation for illegal drug use; and
(4) As part of a voluntary employee drug-testing problem.
The regulations also indicate that an employer may establish
a pre-employment testing program for applicants.
In addition to these basic substantive requirements, the
Department of Defense regulations require a contractor to "adopt ap-
propriate personnel procedures to deal with employees who are found to
be using drugs illegally." If a sensitive position employee tests positive
for drug use, then the regulations require the contractor to remove the
employee from his position and prohibit him from returning to duty until
the employee shows his/her ability to perform in a sensitive position
according to the contractor's procedures.
The regulations do not apply to the extent they are inconsis-
tent with state or local law or with an existing collective bargaining
agreement. However, the contractor must agree to make the conflicting
drug-testing provision the subject of negotiation at the next collective
bargaining session. Further, the regulations do not apply to subcontracts.
Finally, the regulations require the Department of Defense
contracting officer to insert a clause containing the regulation's require-
ments in all solicitations and contracts involving access to classified
information or any other contract where the contracting officer determines
that inclusion is necessary for national security reasons or for health or
safety reasons.
The contracting officer is not required to insert this clause in
a commercial contract or a contract that is to be performed outside of the
United States, its territories and possessions.
C. Department of Transportation Requirements
1. Applicability
DOT has issued regulations requiring all motor carriers
which operate commercial motor vehicles in interstate
commerce to implement a drug-free program that in-
cludes various types of drug testing.4 More specifically,
4 DOT has also issued drug-free regulations for the aviation, rail, mass transit, maritime
and pipeline industries. Also, there is legislation pending in Congress that would broaden
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the regulations apply only to motor carriers operating
commercial vehicles that (1) have a g.v.w. or g.c.w. of
26,001 or more pounds; or (2) are designed to carry
more than 15 persons; or (3) are transporting hazardous
materials that require placarding. Motor carriers with
50 or more drivers subject to testing must have a testing
program in place by December 21, 1989. Similarly,
motor carriers with less than 50 drivers subject to
testing are required to implement a program by Decem-
ber 21, 1990.
2. General Requirements
Generally, the motor carrier (i.e., employer) is required
to develop and implement a drug-testing program for
its employee drivers and for its contract drivers under
contract for 90 days or more in any 365-day period.
This includes developing an Employee Assistance Pro-
gram, informing drivers, training supervisors, complet-
ing and maintaining records, and either employing
personnel who can collect urine specimens or contract-
ing with an agency to perform collections. Regardless
of whether the motor carrier collects urine samples or
contracts with another entity to do the collections, the
motor carrier is responsible for ensuring that federal
regulations regarding collection are complied with.
3. Employee Assistance Program ("EAP")
The EAP requirement consists merely of education and
training. Basically, all supervisors and drivers must
receive training on the following:
(a) the effects and consequences of controlled sub-
stance use on personal health, safety, and the
work environment; and
(b) the manifestations and behavioral causes that
may indicate Controlled substance use or abuse.
The EAP training must be "effective" and be at least
60 minutes long. Also, the motor carrier must maintain documentation of
training given to drivers and supervisory personnel.
4. Testing Requirements
the testing of workers in the rail, aviation and trucking industries. See (HR 1208) and
(S 561). However, this outline does not discuss these additional regulations or this pending
legislation.
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The regulations require testing in the following five
situations: (1) prior to employment; (2) during the first
medical examination of the driver after implementation
of the program; (3) when a supervisor has "reasonable
cause" to believe that the actions or appearance or
conduct of a driver "on duty" (as defined in 49 CFR
§ 395.2) are indicative of drug use; (4) no later than
32 hours after a reportable accident; and (5) on a ran-
dom basis in which 50 percent of the motor carrier's
drivers are tested over a 12-month period.
a. Pre-employment Testing
Pre-employment testing applies to drivers a
motor carrier intends to use or to hire. The driver
must submit to testing as a pre-qualification, but
before the testing, the driver must be informed
that a urine sample will be taken and tested for
the presence of drugs. Also,if the driver-ap-
plicant requests the results of the drug test within
60 days of the date he was notified of the disposi-
tion of his application, he must be told the results
of his test.
There are two exceptions to pre-employment
testing. They are as follows:
(1) If the driver is a regularly employed driver
of another motor carrier and the other
motor carrier certifies that he is fully
qualified to drive a motor vehicle in ac-
cordance with 49 CFR § 391.65;
(2) Adriver can be "used" (Le., not employed)
without testing if he participates in a testing
program that meets the requirements of the
regulations and the motor carrier contacts
the testing program to determine (a) the
name and address of the program,
(b) verification that the driver participates
in the program, (c) verification that the
program comports with federal regula-
tions, (d) the date that the driver was last
tested, and (e) verification that the driver is
qualified (drug-free) under these regula-
tions. This information must be kept
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separate from the motor carrier's own
drug-testing program.
If the motor carrier intends to take advantage of
these exceptions, the information obtained pur-
suant to them must be kept in the driver's
qualification file.
b. Reasonable Cause Testing
Testing is required when motor carriers have
reasonable cause to believe that the actions or
appearance or conduct of a driver on duty are
indicative of drug use. Reasonable cause must be
based on conduct that is witnessed by at least two
supervisors, if feasible. However, one supervisor
will suffice if there is no other supervisor avail-
able. The witnesses must have received training
in the detection of probable drug use by observ-
ing a person's behavior. The witnesses must
document the driver's conduct either within
24 hours of the observed behavior, or before the
results of the tests are released, whichever is
earlier. The suspected driver must be transported
"immediately" to the place where the urine
sample will be taken. The motor carrier is respon-
sible for ensuring that the procedures used for
taking the urine sample comport with federal
regulations, and the motor carrier must notify the
driver of the results.
c. Post-Accident Testing
Post-Accident testing means the driver must pro-
vide a urine specimen for testing no later than
32 hours after a reportable accident, which is one
involving death, injury requiring immediate
treatment, or total property damage exceeding
$4,400. If the driver is seriously injured and
cannot provide a specimen, he must authorize the
release of those medical records which would
indicate whether there were any drugs in his
system. The driver must ensure that the specimen
is forwarded and processed in accord with federal
regulations.
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If the driver is involved in a fatal accident and he
refuses drug testing, or he tests positive, he will
be disqualified for a period of one year.
In filling out the accident report forms required
by federal regulations, the motor carrier must
note any drug testing, if performed, and the
results of such testing. Also, the motor carrier is
responsible for ensuring that the driver is notified
of the results, including what drug was dis-
covered, if the results were positive.
d. Random testing
5
Random testing means that the tests are unan-
nounced and that 50 percent of the drivers subject
to testing are tested annually. Special rules for the
first 12 months of random testing apply as fol-
lows:
(1) the testing must be spread reasonably
throughout the 12-month period;
(2) the last test collection during the year is to
be conducted at an annualized rate of
50 percent; and
(3) the total number of drivers tested during
the 12 months is to be equal to 25 percent
of the drivers subject to the testing.
The driver must be notified of the results, includ-
ing what drug was found, if the results were
positive.
5. Consequences to Driver for Positive Test
A driver who uses drugs, or who tests positive for
drugs, may not be "on duty" as defined in 49 CFR
§ 395.2. A driver who has tested positive for
drugs is medically unqualified to operate a com-
mercial vehicle, and thus cannot return to work
until such time as he no longer uses drugs, tests
5 On November 6, 1989, DOT announced that it was deferring until further notice the
December 21, 1989 implementation date of its random and certain mandatory post-accident
drug testing for motor carriers. Reported in 214 Daily Labor Report at F-1-2, Nov. 7, 1989.
This action was prompted by a federal court injunction that bars DOT from imposing its
random and post-accident testing rules and by six pending lawsuits that challenge these
portions of the regulations. However, DOT will enhance its December 21, 1989 implemen-
tation deadline for its pre-employment, periodic, reasonable cause and unenjoined post-ac-
cident testing rules.
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negative for drugs, and is medically recertified.
A driver who refuses to be tested will be treated
the same as one who tests positive. If the driver
tests positive, he may rebut the medical dis-
qualification by showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the drug was prescribed by a
physician who is familiar with the driver's medi-
cal history and assigned duties. The motor carrier




Individual negative test results must be
kept at least 12 months. All other records
related to the administration and results of
the drug-testing program must be main-
tained at least five years.
(b) Location
The Medical Review Officer must be the
sole custodian of individuals' test results.
The driver's qualification file will contain
only the following information: (a) that the
driver submitted to drug testing; (b) the
date of the test; (c) the location of the test;
(d) the identity of the person or entity per-
forming the test; and (e) whether the result
was positive or negative.
(c) Content
The motor carrier must also maintain a
summary, by calendar year, of the records
related to the administration and results of
the drug-testing program that reflects at
least the following eight items:
(1) the total number of tests ad-
ministered;
.(2) the number of tests administered by
category (random, reasonable cause,
etc.);
(3) the total number of individuals who
failed;
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(4) the total number of individuals who
failed broken down by categories
(Le., random, reasonable cause,
etc.);
(5) the consequences to each individual
who failed, broken down by testing
category;
(6) the total number of times the
laboratory found sufficient indica-
tion of the presence of drugs to war-
rant a confirmatory test;
(7) the total number of times the
laboratory found in a confirmatory
test a sufficient presence of drugs to
warrant a report of a finding of posi-
tive to the Medical Review Officer;
and
(8) the number reflected in 7 above,
broken down by substance category
(i.e., marijuana, cocaine, etc.).
d. Confidentiality and Production to DOT
Neither the motor carrier nor the Medical
Review Officer can release information
about a driver without the written
authorization of the driver. Also, the motor
carrier must produce upon demand and
permit DOT personnel to examine all
records related to the administration and
results of drug testing.
VI. Federal Statutory Constraints On Drug
Testing
A. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
An employer's ability to test employees for drugs and alcohol
is constrained by the federal handicap discrimination law. The federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and numerous states and local jurisdictions
prohibit discrimination against "handicapped individuals" who are
"otherwise qualified" for employment, and the federal and some state laws
require employers to make reasonable accommodations for handicapped
workers. Thus, if substance abusers are covered under these statutes, an
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employer cannot base adverse employment decisions on information
gained from drug testing, unless the test results show the person is unable
to do the job, or the employer can show that a drug-free lifestyle is a
job-related requirement and that the employer cannot accommodate the
drug user without imposing an "undue hardship" on the employer's
business.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 excludes from the definition
of handicapped persons "any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser
whose current use... prevents such individual from performing the duties
of the job ... or whose employment... would constitute a direct threat
to the property or safety of others." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
Former alcohol and drug users and abusers who are perform-
ing adequately and do not pose a safety threat despite their substance
use/abuse have been held to be protected by the federal handicap dis-
crimination law. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C.
1984), aff'd. 790, F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (alcoholic not currently
addicted to alcohol covered by the Rehabilitation Act); Wallace v.
Veterans Administration, 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988) (former drug
addict who had not taken drugs in nine months covered by Act).
Recently, a government lawyer who was rehabilitating in a
detoxification program at the time of his discharge was held to be
protected under the Rehabilitation Act. Nisperos v. Acting Commissioner
of nmmigration andNaturalization Service, 720 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
However, "casual" or "recreational" drug users may not be
covered by the Rehabilitation Act if their usage is not substantial enough
to create an "impairment." See, e.g., McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 BNA
FEP Cases 225, 228 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (persons whose drug use does not
affect ability to perform a major life activity not handicapped).
Even if a drug or alcohol abuser is "handicapped," he or she
must be "qualified" in order to be protected by the federal Rehabilitation
Act. Thus, a drug or alcohol user who is not excluded from the definition
of "handicapped" persons by § 706(7)(B) may be qualified for the job if
he or she is capable of performing the essential functions of the job with
"reasonable accommodations" to his or her handicap.
Reasonable accommodations may include time off to attend
rehabilitation or detoxification programs. Whitlock v. Donovan, 598,
F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(employer failed to reasonably accommodate employee where it did not
offer leave without pay for second treatment in rehabilitation program);
but see Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir.
1988) (police officer who tested positive for illegal drugs not entitled to
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the accommodation of participating in rehabilitation program because his
use of marijuana violated laws he had sworn to uphold) cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1636 (1989).
VII. Challenges to Drug-testing Programs
Brought Under State Constitutional and
Tort Law Theories
A number of recent cases have considered plaintiffs' challenges to
drug-testing plans under state constitutional and tort law claims. General-
ly, they have been unsuccessful.
For example, in DiTomaso v. Electronic Data Systems, 3 BNA IER
Cases 1700 (E.D. Mich. 1988) the court held that security guards who
were employed by a private sector employer and terminated after random
testing revealed evidence of marijuana use could not bring claims for
wrongful discharge based on the Michigan constitution, common law
invasion of privacy or other torts.
The court rejected plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim because it
was based on the violation of a public policy against unreasonable
searches and seizures found in the state constitution, which like the
Federal constitution, was not applicable to the acts of private sector
employers. The court also refused to consider plaintiff's state common
law claim of invasion of privacy, rejecting the notion that off-duty illegal
drug use is by right a private matter unless the employer can show that it
affects work performance. The court found that the right to be free from
intrusion is not absolute and that the employer had a legitimate interest in
ensuring that its security officers were free from drug use prior to the
formation of any reasonable suspicion. Moreover, the court found that the
circumstances under which the tests were administered would not be
considered objectionable to a reasonable person. Thus, there was no
common law invasion of privacy. The court further rejected claims of
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, race discrimination and violation of the
Michigan Handicapped Civil Rights Act.
Similarly, in Luedtke v. the Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 4 BNA
IER Cases 129, (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1989) the Alaska Supreme Court rejected
a claim by workers on an oil rig that refusal to take a drug test violated a
specific provision in the Alaska Constitution prohibiting infringement on
the people's right to privacy, as well as claims of wrongful termination
and common law invasion of privacy. The court concluded that the state
constitutional right to privacy was only applicable to state action and did
not apply to the private employer in question. With respect to the wrongful
termination claim, the court concluded that while there is a public policy
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supporting the protection of employee privacy, and a violation of this
policy might rise to the level of a breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing suggesting a wrongful termination, the competing public
concern for employee safety in the hazardous occupation in question
compelled a conclusion that the covenant was not breached. Finally, the
court found no common law invasion of privacy because it concluded that
the employer had a right to test employees for drug use. Additionally, the
drug tests in question and use of the results thereof were consented to by
the plaintiffs.
In contrast to the cases above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n. v. Massachusetts
Racing Commission, 4 BNA IER Cases 147 (1989) struck down random
and reasonable suspicion testing of owners, trainers, jockeys and other
employees licensed by the state to engage in the horse racing industry in
Massachusetts as violations of the state constitution. The court rejected
the contention that the testing was permissible as an administrative search
as set forth in Shoemaker v. Handle, 749 F.2d 1136, cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (3rd Cir. 1986), (upholding testing of jockeys) stating that few courts
had followed Shoemaker. It declined to consider the issue under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it concluded that
Article 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution afforded the plaintiffs more
substantive protection than the Fourth Amendment. The court stated that
under the state constitution, random drug testing cannot be justified solely
by, or hinge upon, the extent to which an industry is heavily regulated.
Nor can it be justified by the interest in deterring use of illegal drugs at
Massachusetts race tracks or protecting the integrity of the industry.
Finally, the court also struck down the reasonable suspicion drug testing
because the regulation "merely requires a belief based on report, informa-
tion, observation, or even 'reasonable circumstances"' to justify testing.
In the collective bargaining context, the First Circuit held in Jackson
v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, (1st Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 3158 (1989) that a union member could not challenge his dismissal
for failing a drug test on state constitutional and common law privacy
grounds because such claims involved interpretation of the labor agree-
ment and thus were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA). In so holding, the court noted that neither the
Massachusetts Constitution or its statutory scheme nor the federal Con-
stitution prohibited drug testing. Thus, there is no absolute right to be free
from drug testing as the law currently existed in the Commonwealth (this
conclusion is subject to debate in light of the holding in Horsemen's
Benevolent and Protective Ass'n., supra). Additionally, the court stated
that it could not conclude as a categorical matter that an employee's drug
use, to the extent that it might have an impact on an employee's work, was
"no business of the employer."
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Finally, the court concluded that as a union member, plaintiff was
obligated to grieve his termination under the collective bargaining agree-
ment rather than sue because Massachusetts law would look to the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement to discern the scope of the privacy
right which plaintiff was attempting to assert. Thus, because plaintiff's
claim involved interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, his
suit was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA under the Supreme Court
decisions in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1877
(1988) and Allis-Chahners v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
VIII. Conclusion
The array of new laws and government regulations mandating drug
control policies for government contractors and grant recipients, as well
as the Supreme Court's interest in deciding whether such laws violate
individual rights show that the law in this area is unsettled but developing
rapidly.
In this legal environment, whether and in what manner an employer
should develop a workforce drug control program depends on a number
of variables: Is the employer a private or public employer? Is it a federal
contractor, and if so, with what federal agency? Is the workforce covered
by a collective bargaining agreement? As a practical matter, is a drug
control policy needed and what impact will it have on both operational
efficiency and employee morale?
While no uniform policy or program can fit all employers, we offer
the following guidelines for individual tailoring:
(1) Determine whether your company is legally required to
adopt a drug control program and, if so, with what
provisions.
(2) Determine whether there are any legal restrictions on
your adoption of a drug control program, such as under
a collective bargaining agreement or under state and
local law.
(3) Establish an employee assistance program for
employees to voluntarily obtain rehabilitation for drug
abuse and further establish a means for self-referral or
referral by supervisors to the program.
(4) Prepare a written statement that expresses the
company's policy prohibiting the manufacture, dis-
tribution, possession or use of illegal drugs at work or
working under the influence of illegal drugs.
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(5) Determine the type of discipline which will occur for
violating the company's policy.
(6) Determine the means which will be used to monitor and
control drug abuse at the workplace, including the
circumstances under which the employer will require
an employee to submit to a drug test, e.g., reasonable
suspicion of drug use or part of a comprehensive "fit-
ness for duty" medical examination, and avoid, where
possible, any policy or practice of indiscriminate drug
testing of employees.
(7) Assure that any drug testing procedures are conducted
in a controlled and confidential manner, comply with
applicable legal requirements, and are sensitive to con-
siderations of privacy.
(8) Question applicants about drug use and treatment only
in the context of a pre-employment physical examina-
tion performed by a physician and not during the ordi-
nary interview process by personnel or other members
of management.
(9) Promulgate the company's policy to all employees and
applicants for employment through an employee hand-
book and by other means; obtain from all incumbent
employees a signed statement acknowledging the
company's drug policy, recognizing that compliance
with the policy is a condition of employment, and
consenting to any drug testing and other means for
assuring that the workplace is free of drugs; and obtain
a statement from all applicants for employment con-
senting to any drug testing as part of the pre-employ-
ment physical.
(10) Assure that the drug policy is disseminated to
employees in a manner which does not create any
contractually binding obligation and preserves
management prerogatives under the employment at
will doctrine to terminate the employment relationship
at any time.
All of these matters should be carefully considered by management,
with the advice of competent legal counsel, prior to implementing any
drug-testing policy.
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